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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Giovanni M. Mendiola appeals from the denial of his petition for post- 
conviction relief. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinas 
Mendiola and his gang (including three brothers, a brother-in-law, and 
three others) were hired by Brendan Butler, a marijuana trafficker in Northern 
Idaho and Eastern Washington, to rob and kill a rival drug trafficker. (R., vol. 11, 
pp. 245-51 .) Mendiola and his gang invaded the home of the rival, tied his and 
his girlfriend's hands, and ransacked the place stealing eight pounds of 
marijuana and between $20,000 and $40,000. (R., vol. II, pp. 251-53.) Brendan 
Butler was dissatisfied because Mendiola failed to kill the rival, and Mendiola was 
upset because he thought he should have been paid more. (R., vol. 11, pp. 253- 
55.) Mendiola and his gang returned about four months later, ostensibly to finish 
the job by killing the rival drug trafficker, but instead Mendiola killed Brendan 
Butler and stole about 56 pounds of marijuana, and expressed anger that Butler 
had not had any cash. (R., vol. II, pp. 255-61.) Mendiola and the others took 
Butler's Cadillac back to Seattle, where they stayed in Mendiola's sisters' 
basement. (R., vol. II, pp. 261-64.) 
The state charged Mendiola with conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery, 
two counts of kidnapping and conspiracy to commit murder in relation to the first 
incident involving the trafficking competitor and conspiracy to commit robbery, 
conspiracy to commit kidnapping, conspiracy to commit murder, and first-degree 
murder for the killing and robbing of Brendan Butler. (R., vol. II, pp. 264-66.) 
Mendiola pled guilty to one count of second-degree murder pursuant to a plea 
agreement. (R., vol. 11, p. 266.) 
Mendiola filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief asserting that he 
wished relief from his conviction and sentence for second-degree murder. (R., 
vol. I, pp. 8-11.) The state answered the petition. (R., vol. I, pp. 12-14.) The 
district court entered a notice of intent to dismiss the petition on the grounds that 
it was unsupported by admissible evidence. (R., vol. I, pp. 15-17.) After several 
extensions of time (R., vol. I, pp. 18-48), Mendiola filed an amended petition (R., 
p. 49). In the amended petition Mendiola alleged that his plea was not freely and 
voluntarily entered and that the trial court failed to establish that it was freely and 
voluntarily entered (R., vol. I, pp. 50-53); that the trial court failed to establish a 
factual basis for the plea when it was entered (R., vol. I, pp. 53-54); and that trial 
counsel was ineffective because a defense investigator had informed the 
prosecutor that the crime Mendiola committed was murder, not manslaughter, 
that counsel failed to challenge the factual basis for the Alford plea, and failed to 
present evidence at sentencing that Mendiola was actually guilty of only 
manslaughter (R., vol. I, pp. 54-56). 
The state answered the amended petition. (R., vol. I, pp. 97-98.) The 
court denied cross motions for summary disposition and set the matter for a 
hearing. (R., vol. I, pp. 101-12, 117-42, 149-56.) At the hearing Mendiola called 
four witnesses and introduced one document (a "kite" by Mendiola) as an exhibit. 
(Tr., pp. 2-3.) The state's response did not include any witnesses, but did include 
_._, .'
.,, . .:@ 
.i.*.:%,. : 
exhibits: registers of action from Mendiola's and his co-defendants' criminal 
cases, a written plea agreement, and an immunity agreement for Justin Miller, a 
co-defendant. (Tr., pp. 2-3; p. 110, L. 15 - p. 113, L. 14.) In addition, the district 
court took judicial notice, from the record in the underlying criminal case, of the 
grand jury transcript, the transcript of the change of plea hearing, the transcript of 
the sentencing hearing, and the state's trial brief. (Tr., p. 102, L. 24 - p. 110, L. 
15.) 
After the hearing the judge denied the petition. (R., vol. II, pp. 233-306.) 
Mendiola filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., vol. II, pp. 307-10.) 
ISSUES 
Mendiola states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when denied [sic] Mr. Mendiola's 
petition for post-conviction relief in light of the numerous erroneous 
factual findings and legal errors that, cumulatively and individually, 
demonstrate that the district court failed to properly adjudicate Mr. 
Mendiola's post-conviction claims? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 18.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1 .  Are Mendiola's claims that the trial court erred in taking his Alford plea of 
guilty because it allegedly failed to establish on the record that the plea was 
knowing, intelligent and voluntary and allegedly failed to establish at the time of 
the plea an adequate factual basis for accepting the plea not proper claims in 
post-conviction because they could have been raised in the criminal proceedings 
or on appeal? 
2. Has Mendiola failed to show error in the district court's denial of his claims 
that his plea was not voluntary or that his counsel provided ineffective assistance 
in failing to challenge the factual basis for the plea? 
3. Has Mendiola failed to show error in the district court's denial of his claims 
that counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence at sentencing? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Mendiola's Claims That The Trial Court Erred In Takina His Alford Plea Of Guilty 
Are Not Proper Claims In Post-Conviction Because Thev Could Have Been 
Raised In The Criminal Proceedinas Or On Appeal 
A. Introduction 
Some of the claims in Mendiola's amended petition for post-conviction 
relief are direct claims of error by the trial court in the criminal proceedings. 
Specifically, Mendiola claimed that the district court in the underlying criminal 
case erred in taking his plea because "[alt the time the guilty plea was entered, 
the trial court did not properly examine Petitioner to determine if the plea was in 
fact freely and voluntarily entered" and because the trial court "did not make a 
proper factual finding to support the entry of the Aiford plea." (R., vol. I, pp. 50, 
53.) The district court rejected the state's argument that these claims were not 
appropriately raised in post-conviction proceedings because they could have 
been raised in the criminal proceedings or on appeal.' (R., vol. I, pp. 150-53; vol. 
II, pp. 235-40.) Application of the law to the facts, as shown below, demonstrates 
that these claims are statutorily barred. Because the district court reached the 
correct conclusion but should have dismissed these claims as procedurally 
barred, the state requests this Court to affirm on the correct basis. See State v. 
Morris, 119 ldaho 448,450, 807 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Ct. App. 1991) (on appellate 
review, the lower court's ruling must be upheld if it is capable of being upheld on 
any theory); State v. Murphy, 129 ldaho 861, 863, 934 P.2d 34, 36 (Ct. App. 
' The state also asserts that if these matters are reached on the merits that 
Mendiola has failed to show error by the district court. 
1997) (where district court's ruling is correct it may be upheld on alternative 
basis). 
B. Standard Of Review 
A trial court's application of law to the facts in post-conviction proceedings 
is subject to free review. Roberts v. State, 132 ldaho 494, 496, 975 P.2d 782, 
784 (1 999). 
C. Mendiola's Claims Of Trial Court Error In Takinq His Guilty Plea Are Not 
Proper Claims In Post-Conviction Proceedinas 
The remedy available under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act 
("UPCPA) "is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the 
proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence or conviction." 
I.C. § 19-4901(b). In addition, an "issue which could have been raised on direct 
appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction 
proceedings" except under very limited circumstances. I.C. 5 19-4901(b). The 
plain language of these statutory provisions indicates that matters that could and 
should have been addressed in the criminal case or on direct appeal are not 
properly brought under the UPCPA. Where, as here, a petitioner asks for relief 
based exclusively upon a transcript of proceedings in the district court and 
presents no new or additional evidence, that petitioner is improperly trying to use 
the UPCPA as a substitute for proceedings in the trial court or on appeal. See 
Hoffman v. State, 125 ldaho 188, 190-91, 868 P.2d 516, 518-19 (Ct. App. 1994) 
(refusing to consider issues that should have been raised on direct appeal). 
Review of the relevant cases shows that a challenge to a guilty plea based 
upon matters outside the record of the underlying criminal proceedings is proper 
in post-conviction proceedings, but that a post-conviction petitioner is not entitled 
under the UPCPA to a mere review of the record of the proceedings in the 
criminal case for error. In Nellsch v. State, 122 ldaho 426, 835 P.2d 661 (Ct. 
App. 1992). Nellsch had been sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 25 
years for first-degree kidnapping, but the ldaho Court of Appeals found the 
sentence illegal, concluding that the minimum sentence was indeterminate life. 
Id. at 429, 835 P.2d at 664. After he had been re-sentenced to indeterminate life 
-
he petitioned in post-conviction proceedings to withdraw his plea. Id. He 
asserted two grounds for relief: first, that he was unaware that the crime he pled 
guilty to required a minimum indeterminate life sentence and, second, that his 
counsel had been ineffective when he entered his guilty plea. at 430, 835 
P.2d at 665. As to the first claim, the court agreed that it was proper to pursue in 
post-conviction proceedings, but concluded that summary dismissal of the claim 
was proper because, although the minimum term had not been explained on the 
record at or before the guilty plea was accepted, it was known to Nellsch at the 
resentencing, and therefore there was no manifest injustice in allowing the plea 
to stand. at 432, 835 P.2d at 667. Stated the Court: 
Although it is true that Nellsch claimed he was unaware of the 
minimum sentence at the time he entered his guilty plea, and that 
he would not have entered the plea if he had been so informed, he 
has failed to explain why he did not attempt to withdraw his plea 
prior to the resentencing hearing or why he did not raise this issue 
on direct appeal from resentencing. Under these circumstances, 
any failure to inform the petitioner of the minimum term prior to 
entry of the plea must be viewed as only a technical deficiency. 
Id. Thus, although the court looked at the record of the underlying case, it did so 
-
only to conclude that it disproved Nellsch's claim. It did not hold that Nellsch was 
entitled to predicate a claim of error raised in post-conviction proceedings solely 
upon the record of the underlying criminal case. Nellsch premised his claim on a 
matter outside the record (his ignorance of the minimum sentence), which the 
appellate court eventually deemed disproved by the record. 
Likewise, in Ricca v. State, f24 ldaho 894, 865 P.2d 985 (Ct. App. 1993), 
Ricca premised a challenge to his guilty plea on an allegation that the "plea was 
involuntary because he was under the influence of medication at the time he 
entered his plea." Id. The ldaho Court of Appeals concluded such claim was not 
barred because Ricca had failed to make a motion to withdraw the plea in the 
criminal case. Id. at 896-97, 865 P.2d at 987-88. The court affirmed summary 
dismissal, however, because Ricca failed to support his claim with any evidence 
that the sleep aid he claimed he was taking would have had any effect on his 
ability to enter a plea. E a t  897, 865 P.2d at 988.' 
The district court cited several other cases in which the ldaho Court of Appeals 
addressed post-conviction claims that guilty pleas were involuntary. (R., vol. 11, 
p. 267.) None of these opinions directly addressed whether the claims would be 
barred by I.C. § 19-4901(b) if the state had asserted it. Odom v. State, 121 
ldaho 625,826 P.2d 1337 (Ct. App. 1992); Amerson v. State, 119 ldaho 994,812 
P.2d 301 (Ct. App. 1991); Simons v. State, 116 ldaho 69, 71, 773 P.2d 1156, 
1158 (Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing that the claim might have been barred by I.C. 
§ 19-4901(b) but deciding to address claim on the merits without resolving this 
issue); Fowler v. State, 109 ldaho 1002, 1003 n.1, 712 P.2d 703, 704 n.1 (Ct. 
App. 1985) (noting that it was unclear whether Fowler's claim would have been 
barred as justiciable on appeal but declining to address the issue because the 
state did not raise it); Schmidt v. State, 103 ldaho 340, 647 P.2d 796 (Ct. App. 
1982). 
Nellsch's and Ricca's claims should be compared with Mendiola's. Unlike 
a claim based on what he actually believed at the time he entered his guilty plea, 
such as made by Nellsch, Mendiola asserted that the district court erred by failing 
to properly examine him. (R., vol. I, p. 50.) Unlike Ricca's claim that he was 
under the influence of medication that prevented a voluntary plea, Mendiola 
complains that the district court erred by failing to make sure an adequate factual 
basis was presented before accepting his guilty plea. (R., vol. I, p. 53.) It is clear 
from the nature of the claims that Mendiola has asserted that he is improperly 
trying to use his post-conviction petition "as a method of appealing from a 
judgment of conviction." Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho 235, 237, 459 P.2d 1017, 
1019 (1969). 
A post-conviction petition is not a substitute for an appeal or other 
remedies available in the original criminal proceedings. Mendiola's claims of 
error by the trial court, based exclusively upon the transcript of the guilty plea 
hearing, are appellate claims. They should have been dismissed because they 
are barred by I.C. fj 19-4901(b). 
II. 
Mendiola Has Failed To Show Error in The District Court's Denial Of His Claims 
That His Plea Was,,Not Voluntarv Or That His Counsel Provided Ineffective 
Assistance In Failing To Challenge The Factual Basis For The Plea 
A. Introduction 
In his petition Mendiola did assert claims challenging his guilty plea that 
were not based solely upon a reading of the underlying record. First, he claimed 
that his plea was in fact coerced by threats to prosecute Mendiola's family 
members. (R., vol. I, pp. 50-53.) Second, he claimed that counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance for failing to challenge the factual basis for the Alford plea. 
(R., voi. I, pp. 54-55.) Although these claims were properly brought to the trial 
court, Mendiola has failed to show that denial of these claims was error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which his claim is based. 
I.C.R. 57(c); Estes v. State, 11 1 ldaho 430,436, 725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986); Clark 
v. State, 92 ldaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969). Where the district court 
conducts a hearing and enters findings of fact and conclusions of law, an 
appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous, 
but will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the district court from those 
facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 ldaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998). 
A trial court's decision that the petitioner has not met his or her burden of proof is 
entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 ldaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 
965 (Ct. App. 1990); see also I.R.C.P. 52(a). 
Mendiola argues that the district court abused its discretion by applying an 
incorrect legal standard. (Appellant's brief, pp. 28-35.) Because the proper 
standard of review is not abuse of discretion but is instead one of free review of 
application of the law to the facts found, whether the district court correctly 
articulated the applicable legal standard is irrelevant. Application of the law to 
the facts found shows no error. 
C. Mendiola Failed To Prove That His Plea Was Coerced BV The 
Prosecution's Promise To Decline Prosecution Of His Sisters If He Pled 
Guiltv 
"A plea of guilty is deemed coerced only where it is improperly induced by 
ignorance, fear or fraud." State v. Hanslovan, 147 ldaho 530, 537.21 1 P.3d 775, 
782 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. Spry, 127 ldaho 107, 110, 897 P.2d 1002, 
1005 (Ct. App. 1995)). A plea is involuntary if an innocent person would have felt 
compelled to plead guilty in light of the circumstances. Hanslovan, 147 ldaho at 
537, 21 1 P3d at 782. Where plea negotiations include state promises about not 
prosecuting loved ones, such negotiations are not coercive in a constitutional 
sense if the state acts in good faith. Id. at 538, 21 1 P.3d at 783 (citing Mata v. 
w, 124 ldaho 588, 594-95, 861 P.2d 1253, 1259-60 (Ct. App. 1993)). The 
prosecutor acts in good faith when the state declines to prosecute a family 
member as part of a plea negotiation if that prosecution would have been 
supported by probable cause. Hanslovan, 147 ldaho at 538 n.8, 21 1 P3d at 783 
n.8; m, 1245 ldaho at 595,861 P.2d at 1260. 
Mendiola presented no evidence of bad faith by the prosecution. At the 
hearing Mendiola called John Adams, the attorney who had represented him in 
the underlying criminal case. (Tr., p. 5, L. 22 - p. 6, L. 18.) He described plea 
negotiations that included Mendiola and his brothers who were co-defendants. 
(Tr., p. 6, L. 19 - p. 8, L. 15.) (Mendiola does not assert on appeal that the 
prosecution against the brothers was not supported by probable cause.) In 
addition, the plea negotiations included discussions that Mendiola's sisters might 
also be charged. (Tr., p. 8, L. 16 - p. 9, L. 1.) Ultimately Mendiola entered an 
Alford plea agreement whereby he would plead guilty to a reduced charge of 
second-degree murder, the other charges in the indictment would be dismissed, 
the state would recommend a sentence of life with twelve and one-half years 
fixed, his co-defendants would receive recommendations for riders on reduced 
charges of being accessories, and the sisters would not be prosecuted. (Tr., p. 
10, L. 18 - p. 11, L. 15.) Although there was evidence that Mendiola pled guilty, 
in part, on reliance on a promise that his sisters would not be prosecuted (see 
Tr.,p.11,L.16-p.12,L.8;p.86,L.21-p.89,L.2;p.94,L.21-p.95,L.6), 
he presented no evidence that the state negotiated that promise in bad faith 
because such a prosecution would have been without probable cause. 
Mendiola concedes that there is no evidence in the record that charges 
against his sisters would not have been supported by probable cause, and were 
therefore made part of the negotiations in bad faith. (Appellant's brief, p. 33 ("the 
record fails to provide any confirmation, in any way, that the prosecution of Mr. 
Mendiola's sisters for some unidentified charge could be supported by probable 
cause").) He argues, however, that it would "defy reason" to make him bear the 
burden of proving that his plea was involuntary. (Appellant's brief, pp. 33-34.) 
He cites no authority that the state had the burden to disprove his post-conviction 
claims (Appellant's brief, pp. 33-34); to the contrary, it is well-established that 
Mendiola, as a post-conviction petitioner, bore the burden of proving his claims 
by a preponderance of evidence. I.C.R. 57(c); Estes v. State, 11 1 ldaho 430, 
438, 725 P.2d 135, 143 (1986); Mata v. State, 124 ldaho 588, 591, 861 P.2d 
1253, 1256 (Ct. App. 1993) (cited in Appellant's brief, pp. 36-38, for other 
propositions but ignored on the burden of proof argument). Because Mendiola 
by his own admission failed to present any evidence on an element of his claim 
that his plea was coerced, he has failed to show that the district court erred in 
denying him re~ief.~ 
D. Mendiola Failed To Establish That The Court Erred Or That His Attorney 
Was Deficient In Relation To Establishins A Factual Basis For The Plea 
An Alford plea may not be withdrawn based upon a claim of actual 
innocence "in cases where there is some basis in the record of factual guilt." 
State v. Dopp, 124 ldaho 481, 486, 861 P.2d 51, 56 (1993) (emphasis added). 
"In determining whether a factual basis for a guilty plea exists, we look to the 
entire record before the frial judge at the time the plea was accepted." State v. 
Ramirez, 122 ldaho 830, 824, 839 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis 
added). Thus, it is proper for a court to look at the transcript of a probable cause 
hearing for the factual basis of a guilty plea. Fowler v. State, 109 ldaho 1002, 
f005, 712 P.2d 703, 706 (Ct. App. 1985) (relying on preliminary hearing 
transcript and PSI for factual basis for plea where defendant denied intent after 
entering plea). As noted above, any aspect of Mendiola's claim that may be 
resolved merely upon the record of the underlying criminal case is not a proper 
The district court also found that the plea was not coerced because Mendiola 
had failed to prove that the actual reason he entered the plea was to protect his 
family, rather than to gain significant advantage for himself. (R., vol. II, pp. 266- 
78.) Mendiola's argument on appeal that the court's factual findings in this 
regard are clearly erroneous because he presented evidence he believes is 
credible to support his claim (Appellant's brief, pp. 24-28) is specious. State v. 
Pern/, 139 ldaho 520, 525, 81 P.3d 1230, 1235 (2003) (credibility determinations 
are exclusive province of trial court); Mitchell v. State, 132 ldaho 274, 276-77, 
971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998) (factual finding disturbed only if clearly erroneous). 
claim under the UPCPA. Thus, the state will address this claim only in the 
context that it was raised as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
To show that counsel was ineffective a petitioner must prove both deficient 
performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washinaton, 466 U.S. 668, 
687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 ldaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 
(1989). An attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 ldaho 631,634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 ldaho 401,406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have 
been different. Araaon v. State, 114 ldaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d I 174, 1 177 
(1 988); Cowaer v. State, 132 ldaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
A claim that counsel should have made a particular motion is properly rejected 
on both prongs of this test if the motion would have been denied by the trial 
court. Sanchez v. State, 127 ldaho 709,713, 905 P.2d 642,646 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Mendiola failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to bring 
a motion to withdraw the guilty plea on the ground of lack of factual basis 
because such a motion would have been denied. At the guilty plea hearing the 
trial court inquired of the parties about the factual basis for the plea and both 
parties referred the court to the transcript of the grand jury proceedings. (R., p. 
299 (citing Change of Plea Tr., p. 17, Ls. 14-22).) As found by the district court, 
the transcript of the grand jury proceedings, in the record of the underlying 
criminal case, provided a more-than-sufficient factual basis for the guilty plea. 
(R., vol. 11, pp. 245-64, 282-83, 297-99, 302-03.) Because the grand jury 
transcript provides a factual basis for the plea and the transcript was in the 
record before the court, any motion challenging the factual basis for the plea 
would have failed. Dopp, 124 ldaho at 486, 861 P.2d at 56; Ramirez, 122 ldaho 
at 824,839 P.2d at 1248. 
Mendiola does not argue that the court was not referred to the grand jury 
transcript or that the grand jury transcript fails to provide a factual basis for the 
plea. (Appellant's brief, pp. 20-28.) Mendiola instead contends that because his 
counsel limited his stipulation, stipulating only that the grand jury transcript 
provided "probable cause," that the lack of a stipulation to the factual basis 
somehow invalidates the guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, pp. 22-23.) Mendiola 
cites no authority for the proposition that a finding of a factual basis for a plea 
may only be found upon the blessing of the defendant's attorney. On the 
contrary, the authority cited by Mendiola (Appellant's brief, p. 23) states that a 
factual basis will be gleaned from "the entire record before the trial judge at the 
time the plea was accepted." Ramirez, 122 ldaho at 824, 839 P.2d at 1248. 
Because the grand jury transcript was in the record before the trial judge, and 
was referenced by both parties as the factual basis for the plea, any challenge to 
the factual basis grounded upon any limitation in defense counsel's stipulation 
would have failed. 
Mendiola next argues that the trial judge had not read the grand jury 
transcript before accepting his plea. (Appellant's brief, pp. 23-24.) Again, 
Mendiola cites no legal authority indicating this fact, even if true, would be a 
relevant basis for a motion to withdraw the plea, much less that Mendiola would 
have prevailed on such a motion. Ramirez, 122 ldaho at 824, 839 P.2d at 
1248. ("In determining whether a factual basis for a guilty plea exists, we look to 
the entire record before the trial judge at the time the plea was accepted."). In 
Fowler v. State, 109 ldaho 1002, 1005, 712 P.2d 703, 706 (Ct. App. 1985), the 
ldaho Court of Appeals stated that it was proper to rely on a PSI - clearly not a 
document made part of the record before the plea was accepted - to, at least in 
part, establish the factual basis for the plea. 
Because Mendiola has supported his appellate arguments with no 
relevant authority, his claim necessarily fails. I.A.R. 35; State v. Zichko, 129 
ldaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996); State v. Li, 131 ldaho 126, 129, 952 
P.2d 1262, 1265 (Ct. App. 1998). Application of the correct legal standard, which 
requires review of the entire record before the trial judge, shows that the grand 
jury transcript provided more than an adequate factual basis for the guilty plea. 
Ill. 
Mendiola Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Claims 
That Counsel Was Ineffective In Failing To Present Evidence At Sentencing 
Mendiola alleged that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present the 
testimony of Marco Garcia, an autopsy report, a toxicology report, and 
unspecified general knowledge that the victim carried a gun, as evidence at 
sentencing to show that Mendiola was really guilty of manslaughter, not the 
murder to which he pled guilty. (R., vol. I, pp. 55-56.) The district court rejected 
the claim, at least in part, because Mendiola never presented to the court the 
evidence he believed his counsel deficiently failed to present. (R., vol. II, pp. 
304-05.~) 
Mendiola had the burden of proving his claims by a preponderance of 
evidence. I.C.R. 57(c); Estes v. State, 11 1 ldaho 430, 436, 725 P.2d 135, 141 
(1986); Clark v. State, 92 ldaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969). The claim he 
had to prove was that his counsel's performance was deficient (that failure to 
present the evidence was because of an objective shortcoming) and that he was 
prejudiced by that deficiency (a reasonable probability that the sentencing would 
have come out differently). See Giles v. State, 125 ldaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 
365, 368 (1994); Araqon v. State, 114 ldaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 
(1988). The district court properly concluded that by failing to submit the 
evidence counsel supposedly was ineffective in not presenting in sentencing, 
Mendiola had not proved his claim. 
On appeal Mendiola fails to explain how the court could have ruled in his 
favor without seeing the evidence in question. (Appellant's brief, pp. 40-44.) 
Mendiola's assumption that evidence he never presented would have established 
facts he claims exist does not meet his burden of proving those facts. Without 
reviewing the evidence it is impossible to ascertain if counsel's performance in 
not submitting it to the court was objectively unreasonable. Likewise, what 
The trial court did reference an affidavit of Marco Garcia that was submitted with 
the petition but never presented as evidence. (R., vol. II, pp. 304-05.) 
17 
prejudice flowed from not having this evidence in sentencing is pure speculation. 
In short, there was simply no proof. Mendiola has failed to show any error in the 
district court's conclusion that in the complete absence of evidence Mendiola had 
not met his burden of proof. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
denying post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 5'h day of March 2010. 
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